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1. Introduction
We provide Montague semantics with a notion of context that allows discourse
dynamics to be tackled. As an example, we consider the problem of intra- and
intersentential pronominal binding. The resulting framework subsumes Discourse
Representation Theory without appealing to any ad hoc deﬁnition. It is based on
Church’s simply typed l-calculus, and the notions of free and bound variables are
as usual. In particular, there is no need for any kind of variable renaming other than
the standard notion of a-conversion.
Thethesis wesupport in thispaper is that dynamicphenomenathat are often
considered to fall outside of the scope of Montague semantics may be handled by
using the standard tools of mathematical logic. In particular, we do not want to ap-
peal to any kind of dynamic notion such as assignment functions that are updated in
an imperative way (which results in the so-called destructive assignment problem).
We use instead the simply typed l-calculus, and the only dynamic notion on which
we rely is the usual relation of b-reduction. There are several advantages in doing
so:
• We do not commit ourselves with any speciﬁc theory. Consequently, our
approach is independent of thetarget logicthat is used to express the meaning
of theexpressions. The user may chooseher or his favoriteframework, which
possiblycomes with its well developed proofand model theories. This allows
one to reuse mathematical and logical knowledge that has been developed for
other areas than computational linguistics.
• The variables we use are as usual in mathematics. In particular the notions of
free and bound occurrences of a variable are the standard ones. As it is the
case that we do not use any assignment function, the meaning we assign to
expressions are closed l-terms. Our approach is therefore akin to Jacobson’s
variable-free semantics (Jacobson 1999). In fact, therelation between the two
approaches is deeper than a simple analogy. We will not have enough space,
however, to develop this point in this paper.
• Finally, from an epistemological point of view, we ﬁnd that explaining some
phenomenon in term of an existing, well established, and well understood
theoryis moresatisfactorythan explainingitin term ofanew (possiblymade-
up) theory. In the latter case, indeed, there is a risk that the phenomenon to
be explained is simply reﬂected in the new theory by some ad hoc primitive.
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M. Gibson and J. Howell (eds), SALT XVI 1-16, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University. As a canonical example of dynamics, we will address the problem of intra-
and intersentential pronominal binding, including quantiﬁcation scoping and don-
key sentences. When trying to give a logical semantics to a discourse, one faces the
problem that quantiﬁers should dynamically extend their scope from one sentence
to another. This problem is solved in Kamp’s Discourse Representation Theory
(Kamp and Reyle 1993) by using sets of reference markers. From an intuitivepoint
of view, these reference markers act as existential quantiﬁers. Nevertheless, from a
technical point of view, they must be considered as free variables, which explains
that they can indeed extend their scope dynamically.
Because ofthishybridstatusofthevariables, onehas to choosecarefully the
names of the new reference markers when constructing a Discourse Representation
Structure (DRS). This problem is particularly salient when trying to combine Dis-
course Representation Theory and Montague semantics (Groenendijk and Stokhof
1990, Muskens 1995) because the merging of two DRSs may result in variable
clashes or, more precisely, in variable assignments that destroy the values previ-
ously assigned. As a consequence, merging two DRSs is either a partial operation
or must include some kind of sophisticated variable renaming in order to avoid
unwanted side effects.
In this paper, we tackle this problem by proposing a new way of combining
Montague semantics and discourse representation. To this end, we provide Mon-
tague semantics with an appropriate notion of context that allow for some kind of
dynamics without violating the usual quantiﬁer scoping rules. In particular, the no-
tions of free and bound variables are as usual, and the operation corresponding to
the merging of two DRSs is performed by standard b-reduction.
2. Expressing Propositions in Context
Quoting van Eijck and Kamp (1997), the key idea behind (...) Discourse Represen-
tation Theory is that each new sentence of a discourse is interpreted in the context
provided by the sentences preceding it. Here, we go two steps further:
1. We will interpret a sentence according to both its left and right contexts. In
other words, the interpretation of a sentence will depend, on the one hand, on
the context made of the sentences preceding it, and on the other hand, on the
context made of the sentences following it.
2. These two kind of contexts will be abstracted over the meaning of the sen-
tences. In other words, the contexts will be passed as parameters to the func-
tions that assign a semantics to the sentences.
These two ideas will be made technically precise in a Montagovian framework.
Montague semantics (Montague 1973) is based on Church’s simple type
theory (Church 1940). This theoryprovidesa fullhierarchy offunctional typesbuilt
2 Philippe de Grooteupon two atomic types: i, the type of individuals, and o, the type of propositions.1
In order to accommodate a notion of context, we add a third atomic type, namely,
g. This type stands for the type of the left contexts.
The type of the right contexts is different. As usual, we only consider dis-
courses made of declarative sentences. Ultimately, such discourses must be inter-
preted as propositions. Now, a right context is a piece of discourse that will be
interpreted as a proposition provided it is given its left context. Consequently, the
type of the right contexts must be g → o. Such a type may be seen as the type of a
continuation (Stratchey and Wadsworth 1974), which is indeed a standard way of
modeling right contexts in denotational semantics.2
Let s be the syntactic category of sentences, and t be the syntactic category
of texts (or discourses). As we said, we intend to abstract over the meaning of a
sentence its left and right contexts. Consequently, we obtain the following semantic
interpretation of s:3
(1) JsK = g → (g → o) → o
and similarly for t:
(2) JtK = g → (g → o) → o
We now face the following question: how does one compose meanings of
sentences in order to get the meaning of a discourse? Let D be a piece of discourse,
and S be a sentence. The semantics of the discourse made of D and S is given by
the following semantic equation:
(3) JD.SK = lef.JDKe(le′.JSKe′f)
This equation may be explained as follows. The semantics of (D.S) must be a term
of type g → (g → o) → o. It has therefore two parameters: e of type g, which
represents the left context of (D.S), and f of type g → o, which represents its right
context. Then the body of the term, which must be of type o, is contributed by the
semantic interpretation of the ﬁrst component of (D.S), namely, JDK. Now, JDK is
itself a term of type g → (g → o) → o. Consequently, it must be passed its left and
right contexts as arguments. The left context of D is nothing but the left context of
(D.S), i.e., e. As for the right context of D, it must be made of S and of the right
context of (D.S). This explains the form of the second argument, le′.JSKe′f.
At this point, it would be interesting to see what is the possible relation be-
tween Kamp’s DRSs and l-terms of type g →(g →o)→o. A DRS is made of a set
1Montague uses different notations: e for the type of individuals (a.k.a. entities), and t for the
type of propositions (a.k.a. truth values). We prefer to stick to Church’s original notations in order
to stress that the propositionsdo not need to be semantically interpretedas Boolean truth values. For
instance, in order to take intensionality into account, the atomic type o may be interpreted as the set
w → t, where w is the set of possible worlds (Carpenter 1996). In fact, our approach is compatible
with non standard logics such as, for instance, intuitionistic logic.
2The use of continuations in natural language semantics has been recently advocated by Barker
(2002, 2004), de Groote (2001b), and Shan (2004).
3In order to save parentheses when writing functional types, we apply the usual notational con-
vention that a → b → c stands for a → (b → c).
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and of a set of logical constraintsC,...,Cm, which are interpreted conjunctively:
x...xn
C
. . .
Cm
To such a structure, the following l-term corresponds :
lef.∃x...xn.C ∧     ∧ Cm ∧ f e′
where e′ is a context made of e and of the variables x,...,xn. Therefore, these
variables fall in the scope of the continuation of the discourse, i.e., f. The precise
way e′ is constructed depends of the concrete structure given to the contexts. We
will be more speciﬁc about this in the next section.
3. Updating and Accessing the Context
Data of type g (i.e., left contexts) are mainly needed to solve pronominal anaphora.
We will not discuss any real anaphoric resolution procedure in this paper, but fo-
cus on the simpler task of computing a discourse representation assuming that the
anaphora are solved by some choice operators that act as oracles. We will use dif-
ferent oracles (selhe, selshe, selit, selhim, selher, ...) for the different possible
pronouns. These operators take a left context as their argument and yield back an
individual. Hence, they obey the following general type assignment scheme:
(4) selx : g → i
We also need some operators that allow the contexts to be updated. For the purpose
of the present discussion, we may consider that the data of type g are simply ﬁnite
sets of individuals on which act the choice operators. If e is such a ﬁnite set and a,b
are individuals, we write a::e for {a}∪e, and a::b::e for a::(b::e). The type of the
operator “::” is then as follows:
(5) :: : i → g → g
Now, consider the two following sentences:
(6) John loves Mary. He smiles at her.
Using the above primitives, these two sentences may be given the following repre-
sentations, respectively:
(7) lef.lovejm ∧ f (m::j::e)
(8) lef.smile(selhee)(selhere) ∧ f e
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reduces as follows:
lef.(lef.lovejm ∧ f (m::j::e))e(le′.(lef.smile(selhee)(selhere) ∧ f e)e′f)
→b lef.(lf.lovejm ∧ f (m::j::e))(le′.(lef.smile(selhee)(selhere) ∧ f e)e′f)
→b lef.(lf.lovejm ∧ f (m::j::e))(le′.(lf.smile(selhee′)(selhere′) ∧ f e′)f)
→b lef.(lf.lovejm ∧ f (m::j::e))(le′.smile(selhee′)(selhere′) ∧ f e′)
→b lef.lovejm ∧ (le′.smile(selhee′)(selhere′) ∧ f e′)(m::j::e)
→b lef.lovejm ∧ smile(selhe(m::j::e))(selher(m::j::e)) ∧ f (m::j::e)
Then, assuming that the choice operators make the correct predictions (which is
only a matter of gender in the present case), we obtain the following semantic rep-
resentation for (6):
lef.lovejm ∧ smilejm ∧ f (m::j::e)
It remains to explain how terms such as (7) or (8) are constructed from the
lexical components of (6). Besides s and t, we consider two other atomic syntactic
categories: n for nouns, and np for noun phrases. Then, we assign the following
syntactic categories to the several components of (6): 4
John,Mary,he,her : np
loves,smiles at : np → np → s
The next step is to specify the semantic interpretation of np. In Montague seman-
tics, noun phrases are interpreted as terms of type
(9) (i → o) → o.
In the present approach, the interpretation of a proposition depends upon a context.
Consequently, let us parameterize the two occurrences of o in (9) with g. This leads
to the following semantic interpretation:
(10) JnpK = (i → g → o) → g → o
As we will see, the ﬁrst occurrence of g in (10) allows noun phrases such as John
or Mary to update the current context, while the second occurrence of g allows
pronominal noun phrases such as he or her to access the current context. In fact,
we will not discuss further Equation (10) because it is provisional.
We are now in a position of giving proper semantic interpretations to the
different noun phrases occurring in (6):
(11) JJohnK = lye.yj(j::e)
4In order not to obfuscate the discussion with syntactic details, we give the syntactic categories
without any feature such as gender, number, case, ... As for the non atomic categories, we only
specify their functionality. It should be clear, however, that our approach is completely consistent
with more realistic grammatical formalisms such as, among others, type logical grammars (Morrill
1994), multimodal grammars (Moortgat 1997), abstract categorial grammars (de Groote 2001a),
lambda-grammars (Muskens 2001), or high-order categorial grammars (Pollard 2004).
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(13) JheK = lye.y(selhee)e
(14) JherK = lye.y(selhere)e
It is not difﬁcult to see that the right-hand sides of the above equations are l-terms
of the appropriate type, i.e, (i → g → o) → g → o.
The interpretations of the transitive verbs seem to be more involved be-
cause they must be of type JnpK → JnpK → JsK. Nevertheless, mutatis mutandis,
they fairly correspond to Montague usual interpretation. The values of JlovesK and
Jsmiles atK are respectively as follows (assuming subject wide scope):
(15) JlovesK = losef.s(lxe.o(lye.lovexy ∧ f e)e)e
(16) Jsmiles atK = losef.s(lxe.o(lye.smilexy ∧ f e)e)e
Besides the parameters of type g, the most signiﬁcant difference with respect to
Montague interpretation is the presence of the conjunct (f e), which models the
right context in which the sentence produced by the transitive verb occurs.
In order to see contexts at work, it is interesting to see how the meaning of
the ﬁrst sentence of (6) may be computed from the above semantic lexical entries:
JlovesKJMaryKJJohnK = (losef.s(lxe.o(lye.lovexy ∧ f e)e)e)JMaryKJJohnK
→b (lsef.s(lxe.JMaryK(lye.lovexy ∧ f e)e)e)JJohnK
→b lsef.JJohnK(lxe.JMaryK(lye.lovexy ∧ f e)e)e
= lsef.(lye.y j(j::e))(lxe.JMaryK(lye.lovexy ∧ f e)e)e
→b lsef.(le.(lxe.JMaryK(lye.lovexy ∧ f e)e)j(j::e))e
→b lsef.(lxe.JMaryK(lye.lovexy ∧ f e)e)j(j::e)
→b lsef.(le.JMaryK(lye.lovejy ∧ f e)e)(j::e)
→b lsef.JMaryK(lye.lovejy ∧ f e)(j::e)
= lsef.(lye.y m(m::e))(lye.lovejy ∧ f e)(j::e)
→b lsef.(le.(lye.lovejy ∧ f e)m(m::e))(j::e)
→b lsef.(lye.lovejy ∧ f e)m(m::j::e)
→b lsef.(le.lovejm ∧ f e)(m::j::e)
→b lsef.lovejm ∧ f (m::j::e)
Other interesting examples are provided by quantiﬁed noun phrases as in
the following example:
(17) Every man loves a woman.
The syntactic categories of the new lexical items are as follows:
man,woman : n
every,a : n → np
We keep Montague’s interpretation of nouns as properties:
(18) JnK = i → o,
which induces the following simple semantic translations:
(19) JmanK = lx.manx
6 Philippe de Groote(20) JwomanK = lx.womanx
Thedeterminersmustbeinterpretedasl-termsoftypeJnK→JnpK, whichisspelled
out as follows:
(i → o) → (i → g → o) → g → o.
Quantiﬁed noun phrases should be allowed to update the current context. This
explains the following interpretations of the quantiﬁers:
(21) JaK = lnye.∃x.nx ∧ yx(x::e)
(22) JeveryK = lnye.∀x.nx ⊃ yx(x::e)
Again, up to the management of contexts, the above interpretations correspond
fairly to Montague’s standard interpretations. Then, the semantic representation
of (17) may be computed by reducing the l-term
(23) JloveK(JaKJwomanK)(JeveryKJmanK)
which yields the following result:
(24) lef.∀x.manx ⊃ (∃y.womany ∧ lovexy ∧ f (y::x::e))
4. Systematizing the Approach
The few examples given in the previous section demonstrate the way our approach,
based on Equation (1), allows Montague semantics to be provided with a notion
of context. Nevertheless, some of the semantic interpretations we propose presents
several limitations.
A ﬁrst defect, due to Equation (10), concerns the scope of the variables
introduced by the quantiﬁed noun phrases. In Kamp’s DRT, there are accessibility
constraints that restrict the scope of the reference markers occurring in a DRS. This
allows some problematic anaphoric links to be ruled out. For instance, it is not
possible to process the following discourse:
(25) Every man loves a woman. ?He smiles at her.
Indeed, the reference markers corresponding to the noun phrases every man and
a woman are not available when processing the second sentence. Our approach
should reﬂect properly such accessibility constraints. Unfortunately, this is not the
case with the semantic interpretation given so far to the determiner every. This ap-
pears in (24) where the conjunct f (y::x::e), which corresponds to the right context
of the sentence, falls in the scope of both quantiﬁers. This would allow (25) to be
processed in a completely unsatisfactory way.
Another defect concerns the interpretation of nouns as properties. This is
certainly ﬁne for simple nouns such as man or woman, but cannot work for more
complex expressions such as man who loves a woman. Expressions of this kind,
which belong to category n, possibly include noun phrases or sentences as sub-
components. Therefore, processing a noun possibly appeals to the processing of
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one should be able to access contexts. Consequently, when processing a noun, one
should also be able to access contexts. This implies that the interpretation of a noun
should include somehow parameters of type g.
In order to solve these problems, let us go back to Montague’s original in-
terpretations of the syntactic categories:
(26) JsK = o
(27) JnK = i → o
(28) JnpK = (i → o) → o
These equations may be rephrased as follows:
(29) JsK = o
(30) JnK = i → JsK
(31) JnpK = (i → JsK) → JsK
Now, in order to be completely consistent with our analysis of Section 2, we must
replace Equation (29) with Equation (1), and propagate this change in both Equa-
tions (30) and (31). This yields the following interpretations of n and np:
(32) JnK = i → g → (g → o) → o
(33) JnpK = (i → g → (g → o) → o) → g → (g → o) → o
Although these two equations have been obtained in a systematic way, we must
justify them on some intuitive ground because they appear to be rather complex.
Nevertheless, we claim that they are not counterintuitive.
As we said, the interpretation of a noun possibly depends on the current
context. A natural way of implementing this dependency is to abstract our notion
of context (made of both a left and a right context) over the usual interpretation of
a noun. This would yield g → (g → o) → i → o as the interpretation of n, which is
indeed isomorphic to (32).
As for the noun phrases, Equation (10) has been obtained by parameterizing
withg bothoccurrences ofo inMontague’stype(i →o)→o. By doingso, wewent
halfway to providing np with its proper interpretation. There is indeed no reason
for giving a greater place to the left contexts than to the right ones. Consequently,
we should also have parameterized the interpretation of np with g → o, which is
the type of the right contexts. Doing so, we obtain (33) as an interpretation. This
explanation is maybe too technical to be completely satisfactory. Therefore, let us
see how Equation (31) sheds some light on Equation (33). By interpreting a noun
phrase as a term of type (i → o) → o, Montague identiﬁes an entity with the set
of all its properties. This relies on Leibniz’s principle which says that two entities
are equal if there is no property that allows ones to discriminate one from the other.
In Montague’s case, a property (i.e., a term of type i → o) may be seen as the
interpretation of a sentence with a “hole” of type i. In our case, a term of type
i → JsK may be seen as the interpretation of a complete discourse with a “hole”
of type i. Let us call such a term a semantic context. Then, what Equation (31)
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semantic context that allows ones to distinguish one from the other. Of course, as
in Montague’s case, this also allows for the interpretations of noun phrases that do
not correspond to any entity, such as nobody.
Let us see now how Equations (32) and (33) affect the semantic interpreta-
tions given in Section 3.
4.1. Nouns
The interpretation of a noun such as man should be a l-term of type (32), i.e.,
i → g → (g → o) → o
Consequently, it takes three parameters of types i, g, and g →o, respectively. Then,
assuming that the main mode of semantic composition is conjunctive, we obtain the
following interpretation:
(34) JmanK = lxef.manx ∧ f e
4.2. Noun Phrases
The interpretation of a noun phrase such as Mary, which must be of type (33), is
adapted as follows:
(35) JMaryK = lyef.yme(le.f (m::e))
The ﬁrst parameter, y, is of type i → JsK. It needs three arguments of type i, g,
and g → o, respectively. The ﬁrst argument must be an individual, in this case m.
The second argument corresponds to the current left context, namely, e. The third
argument (i.e., le.f (m::e)) corresponds to a new right context made of the current
right context (f) together with an updating of the current left context.
As for the interpretation of a pronominal noun phrase such as he, it is
straightforward:
(36) JheK = lyef.y(selhee)ef
4.3. Transitive Verbs
The interpretation of a transitive verb such as love must obey the following type:
(37) JnpK → JnpK → JsK
By unfolding completely the deﬁnitions of JnpK and JsK in (37), one would obtain
a quite complex type scheme. There is no reason, however, for doing so. In order
to understand the interpretations of the transitive verbs, we ﬁrst unfold partially the
two occurrences of JnpK:
(38) ((i → JsK) → JsK) → ((i → JsK) → JsK) → JsK
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(39) ((i → g → (g → o) → o) → JsK) → ((i → JsK) → JsK) → JsK
This explains the followinginterpretation, which remains quite close to Montague’s
one:
(40) JloveK = los.s(lx.o(lyef.lovexy ∧ f e))
4.4. Determiners
The interpretations of the determiners are more interesting. They must be of type
(41) JnK → JnpK
which partially unfolds as:
(42) JnK → (i → JsK) → g → (g → o) → o
Consequently, they have four parameters of types JnK, i → JsK, g, and g → o, re-
spectively. The interpretation of the existential determiner is as follows:
(43) JaK = lnyef.∃x.nxe(le.yx(x::e)f)
The ﬁrst parameter, which is of type JnK is the head of the interpretation. It needs
three arguments: an individual, which is the logical variable introduced by the ex-
istential quantiﬁer, a left context, which is the current left context (e), and ﬁnally its
right context, which is expressed as (le.yx(x::e)f). Using (34) and (43), it is not
difﬁcult to see that the interpretation of a noun phrase such as a man reduces to:
(44) lyef.∃x.manx ∧ yx(x::e)f
It is important to note that the conjunction occurring in this term does not come
from the interpretation of the determiner but from the interpretation of the noun.
Finally, the interpretation of the universal quantiﬁer every is as follows:
(45) JeveryK = lnyef.(∀x.¬(nxe(le.¬(yx(x::e)(le.⊤))))) ∧ f e
Remark the use of negation in order to turn the conjunction that is implicitly con-
tained in n into an implication.5 Remark also that the right context given to y is
not the current right context but an empty right context (le.⊤). This allows DRT
accessibility constraints to be satisﬁed by limiting the scope of the universal quan-
tiﬁcation.
4.5. Relative Pronouns
The case of the relative pronouns is also interesting. A relative pronoun such as
who must be of type:
5This use of negation together with de Morgan’s laws seems to indicate that our approach is tied
to classical logic. It is actually not the case because the way we use negation respects intuition-
istic polarity constraints. Therefore, in a intuitionistic setting, ¬ may be considered as a polarity
switching operator.
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This type may be partially unfolded as follows:
(47) (JnpK → JsK) → JnK → i → g → (g → o) → o
The ﬁrst parameter, which is of type(JnpK→JsK, corresponds to the relativeclause,
and the second parameter, of type JnK, corresponds to the antecedent of the relative
pronoun. The other parameters come from the unfolding of the second occurrence
ofJnKin(46). Theycorrespondsrespectivelytotheindividualtowhichtheresulting
semantic property applies, to the current left context, and to the continuation of the
discourse. This leads to the following interpretation:
(48) JwhoK = lrnxef.nxe(le.r(ly.yx)ef)
The head of this interpretation is n, the antecedent of the relative pronoun. It must
be given three arguments: the individual x, its left context (i.e., e), and its right
context. Now, the right context of n must be made of the relative clause, namely,
r. In turn, r must be given three arguments: the individual x in its type-raised
form (i.e., ly.yx), its left context, and its right context. This explains the form of
subterm le.r(ly.yx)ef.
5. A Toy Example
As a ﬁnal example, we do not resist to consider Geach’s famous donkey sentence
(Geach 1962):
(49) Every farmer who owns a donkey beats it.
It is well known that such a sentence is quite a puzzle:
• There is a pronominal anaphora to be solved. This anaphora has the same
complexity as an intersentential anaphora because the antecedent of the pro-
noun occurs in the relative clause.
• The existential quantiﬁcation occurring in the relative clause must extend its
scope over the complete sentence. Consequently, it must be semantically
interpreted as a universal quantiﬁcation.
• In order to respect DRT accessibility constraints, the reference markers corre-
sponding to every farmer and to a donkey should not be available for further
processing.
The following toy grammar, whose entries are consistent with Section 4,
will allow (49) to be processed.
Towards a Montagovian Account of Dynamics 11expression category interpretation
farmer n lxef.farmerx ∧ f e
donkey n lxef.donkeyx ∧ f e
owns np → np → s los.s(lx.o(lyef.ownxy ∧ f e))
beats np → np → s los.s(lx.o(lyef.beatxy ∧ f e))
who (np → s) → n → n lrnxef.nxe(le.r(ly.y x)ef)
a n → np lnyef.∃x.nxe(le.yx(x::e)f)
every n → np lnyef.(∀x.¬(nxe(le.¬(y x(x::e)(le.⊤))))) ∧ f e
it np lyef.y(selite)ef
Let us assumethatsomesyntacticprocessingof(49) yieldsthefollowingparse tree:
Every farmer who owns a donkey beats it
n → np n (np → s) → n → n np → np → s n → np n np → np → s np
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Then, the semanticrepresentation of (49) may be computed by reducing the follow-
ing l-term:
(50) JbeatsKJitK(JeveryK(JwhoK(JownsK(JaKJdonkeyK))JfarmerK))
Let us start by computing the meaning of the noun phrase a donkey.
JaKJdonkeyK
= (lnyef.∃y.nye(le.yy(y::e)f))JdonkeyK
→b lyef.∃y.JdonkeyKye(le.yy(y::e)f)
= lyef.∃y.(lxef.donkeyx ∧ f e)ye(le.yy(y::e)f)
→b lyef.∃y.(lef.donkeyy ∧ f e)e(le.yy(y::e)f)
→b lyef.∃y.(lf.donkeyy ∧ f e)(le.yy(y::e)f)
→b lyef.∃y.donkeyy ∧ (le.yy(y::e)f)e
→b lyef.∃y.donkeyy ∧ yy(y::e)f
At this point, it is already the case that the variable introduced by the ex-
istential quantiﬁer has been made available in the context of the continuation. Re-
mark, however, that the above l-term is closed because the continuation falls into
the scope of the existential quantiﬁer.
12 Philippe de GrooteWe proceed with the verb phrase owns a donkey.
JownsK(JaKJdonkeyK)
= (los.s(lx.o(lyef.ownxy ∧ f e)))(JaKJdonkeyK)
→b ls.s(lx.JaKJdonkeyK(lyef.ownxy ∧ f e))
= ls.s(lx.(lyef.∃y.donkeyy ∧ yy(y::e)f)(lyef.ownxy ∧ f e))
→b ls.s(lxef.∃y.donkeyy ∧ (lyef.ownxy ∧ f e)y(y::e)f)
→b ls.s(lxef.∃y.donkeyy ∧ (lef.ownxy ∧ f e)(y::e)f)
→b ls.s(lxef.∃y.donkeyy ∧ (lf.ownxy ∧ f (y::e))f)
→b ls.s(lxef.∃y.donkeyy ∧ ownxy ∧ f (y::e))
The resulting l-term expresses the meaning of the body of the relative
clause who owns a donkey. It must be passed as an argument to the meaning of
who in order to get the meaning of the relative clause.
JwhoK(JownsK(JaKJdonkeyK))
= (lrnxef.nxe(le.r(ly.y x)ef))(JownsK(JaKJdonkeyK))
→b lnxef.nxe(le.JownsK(JaKJdonkeyK)(ly.y x)ef)
= lnxef.nxe(le.(ls.s(lxef.∃y.donkeyy ∧ ownxy ∧ f (y::e)))(ly.y x)ef)
→b lnxef.nxe(le.(ly.yx)(lxef.∃y.donkeyy ∧ ownxy ∧ f (y::e))ef)
→b lnxef.nxe(le.(lxef.∃y.donkeyy ∧ ownxy ∧ f (y::e))xef)
→b lnxef.nxe(le.(lef.∃y.donkeyy ∧ ownxy ∧ f (y::e))ef)
→b lnxef.nxe(le.(lf.∃y.donkeyy ∧ ownxy ∧ f (y::e))f)
→b lnxef.nxe(le.∃y.donkeyy ∧ ownxy ∧ f (y::e))
We may now apply the abovel-term to JfarmerK in order to get the meaning
of farmer who owns a donkey.
JwhoK(JownsK(JaKJdonkeyK))JfarmerK
= (lnxef.nxe(le.∃y.donkeyy ∧ ownxy ∧ f (y::e)))JfarmerK
→b lxef.JfarmerKxe(le.∃y.donkeyy ∧ ownxy ∧ f (y::e))
= lxef.(lxef.farmerx ∧ f e)xe(le.∃y.donkeyy ∧ ownxy ∧ f (y::e))
→b lxef.(lef.farmerx ∧ f e)e(le.∃y.donkeyy ∧ ownxy ∧ f (y::e))
→b lxef.(lf.farmerx ∧ f e)(le.∃y.donkeyy ∧ ownxy ∧ f (y::e))
→b lxef.farmerx ∧ (le.∃y.donkeyy ∧ ownxy ∧ f (y::e))e
→b lxef.farmerx ∧ ∃y.donkeyy ∧ ownxy ∧ f (y::e)
We are nowin apositionofcomputingthemeaning ofthenoun phraseevery
farmer who owns a donkey.
JeveryK(JwhoK(JownsK(JaKJdonkeyK))JfarmerK)
= (lnyef.(∀x.¬(nxe(le.¬(y x(x::e)(le.⊤))))) ∧ f e)
(JwhoK(JownsK(JaKJdonkeyK))JfarmerK)
→b lyef.(∀x.¬(
JwhoK(JownsK(JaKJdonkeyK))JfarmerKxe(le.¬(y x(x::e)(le.⊤)))
)) ∧ f e
= lyef.(∀x.¬(
(lxef.farmerx ∧ ∃y.donkeyy ∧ ownxy ∧ f (y::e))
xe(le.¬(y x(x::e)(le.⊤)))
)) ∧ f e
Towards a Montagovian Account of Dynamics 13→b lyef.(∀x.¬(
(lef.farmerx ∧ ∃y.donkeyy ∧ ownxy ∧ f (y::e))
e(le.¬(yx(x::e)(le.⊤)))
)) ∧ f e
→b lyef.(∀x.¬(
(lf.farmerx ∧ ∃y.donkeyy ∧ ownxy ∧ f (y::e))
(le.¬(yx(x::e)(le.⊤)))
)) ∧ f e
→b lyef.(∀x.¬(farmerx ∧ ∃y.donkeyy ∧ ownxy∧
(le.¬(y x(x::e)(le.⊤)))(y::e)
)) ∧ f e
→b lyef.(∀x.¬(farmerx ∧ ∃y.donkeyy ∧ ownxy ∧ ¬(y x(x::y::e)(le.⊤))))
∧f e
≡ lyef.(∀x.farmerx ⊃ (∀y.(donkeyy ∧ ownxy) ⊃ y x(x::y::e)(le.⊤))) ∧ f e
There are two continuation parameters in the above l-term, namely, y and
f. The ﬁrst one, which comes from Montague type raising, is a local continuation
that corresponds to the continuation of the sentence. The second one is the con-
tinuation of the discourse. Remark that the variables introduced by the quantiﬁers
(x and y) are only available to the local continuation. This corresponds to Kamp’s
accessibility conditions.
We now compute the meaning of the verb phrase beats it.
JbeatsKJitK
= (los.s(lx.o(lyef.beatxy ∧ f e)))JitK
→b ls.s(lx.JitK(lyef.beatxy ∧ f e))
= ls.s(lx.(lyef.y (selite)ef)(lyef.beatxy ∧ f e))
→b ls.s(lxef.(lyef.beatxy ∧ f e)(selite)ef)
→b ls.s(lxef.(lef.beatx(selite) ∧ f e)ef)
→b ls.s(lxef.(lf.beatx(selite) ∧ f e)f)
→b ls.s(lxef.beatx(selite) ∧ f e)
Finally, we may compute the meaning of the complete sentence.
JbeatsKJitK(JeveryK(JwhoK(JownsK(JaKJdonkeyK))JfarmerK))
= (ls.s(lxef.beatx(selite) ∧ f e))
(JeveryK(JwhoK(JownsK(JaKJdonkeyK))JfarmerK))
→b JeveryK(JwhoK(JownsK(JaKJdonkeyK))JfarmerK)(lxef.beatx(selite) ∧ f e)
= (lyef.(∀x.farmerx ⊃ (∀y.(donkeyy ∧ ownxy) ⊃ yx(x::y::e)(le.⊤))) ∧ f e)
(lxef.beatx(selite) ∧ f e)
→b lef.(∀x.farmerx ⊃ (∀y.(donkeyy ∧ ownxy) ⊃
(lxef.beatx(selite) ∧ f e)x(x::y::e)(le.⊤)
)) ∧ f e
→b lef.(∀x.farmerx ⊃ (∀y.(donkeyy ∧ ownxy) ⊃
(lef.beatx(selite) ∧ f e)(x::y::e)(le.⊤)
)) ∧ f e
→b lef.(∀x.farmerx ⊃ (∀y.(donkeyy ∧ ownxy) ⊃
(lf.beatx(selit(x::y::e)) ∧ f (x::y::e))(le.⊤)
)) ∧ f e
→b lef.(∀x.farmerx ⊃ (∀y.(donkeyy ∧ ownxy) ⊃ beatx(selit(x::y::e))∧
(le.⊤)(x::y::e)
)) ∧ f e
14 Philippe de Groote→b lef.(∀x.farmerx ⊃ (∀y.(donkeyy ∧ ownxy) ⊃ beatx(selit(x::y::e)) ∧ ⊤))
∧f e
≡ lef.(∀x.farmerx ⊃ (∀y.(donkeyy ∧ ownxy) ⊃ beatx(selit(x::y::e)))) ∧ f e
Assuming that the choice operator selects correctly y, we obtain the following rep-
resentation:
(51) lef.(∀x.farmerx ⊃ (∀y.(donkeyy ∧ ownxy) ⊃ beatxy)) ∧ f e
6. Conclusions
Our approach to handling contexts in a Montagovian framework solves several
compositionality problems one encounters when trying to accommodate Discourse
Representation Theory and Montague semantics.
In addition, it is rather general. As we suggested, it does not depend on the
target logic. It does not depend either of the very structure given to the data of type
g. The :: operator could be used to record more relevant information such as mor-
phosyntactic features (gender, number, case,...), actor focus, and discourse focus.
Then, the choice operators could be turned in more realistic anaphora resolution
algorithms.
In this paper, we restricted our analysis to the case of declarative discourses
that may be interpreted as classical logical propositions, avoiding the several prob-
lems related to tense, aspect, intensionality, modality, ... We did not consider either
deﬁnite descriptions. These different topics will be the subjects of future works.
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